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I. INTRODUCTION

When I was preparing to launch my career as a torts professor at
the University of Denver College of Law in the fall of 1964, I found a
rather thin menu of casebooks from which to choose. However, the
editors of these tomes were towering figures in the field, a fact that
more than made up for (and perhaps explained) the paucity of available teaching materials. The list included Prosser and Smith,' perfectly straight-forward in its approach and burnished by the recognition that its lead editor was the most influential torts scholar of the
day;2 Seavey, Keeton, and Keeton, 3 leavening a stolid devotion to the
case method with an occasional and, for its day, innovative use of cartoons; 4 Green et al.,' with opinions and text uniquely paraded in factual categories such as public-service companies6 and horse-andbuggy traffic; 7 Shulman and James, 8 notable for employing a workers'
compensation opinion as its engine9 and consigning intentional torts to
the caboose;1" and the "new kid on the block," Gregory and Kalven."1
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Prosser and Smith would have been the safest selection, its heavily-edited cases faithfully tracking the leading treatise in the field,12
and its avowed aim to "be all things to all men,"' 3 underscoring, perhaps unconsciously, that torts teaching was still pretty much a fraternity, and at the same time reflecting a marketing strategy the success
of which would be difficult to criticize. Seavey and the brothers
Keeton offered raw material for a "hide-the-ball" Socratic approach to
the subject, as well as the only available teacher's manual. 4 Green
featured what in my judgment was the most interesting selection of
cases, both on their facts and in the variety of issues they raised, but
making sense of the arrangement of the opinions seemed beyond the
reach of one not schooled in the fundamentals of legal realism."5 Shulman and James provided a unique focus on tort law as a mechanism
for distributing losses,' 6 but by the mid-1960's, the materials had become woefully out of date. Gregory and Kalven, a soi-disant "casebook with a view,"' 7 had the most contemporary feel to it, as well as
rich chapters on personal-injury damages 8 and defamation. 9 As happens, I suspect, with most novices, I chose to go with the casebook
that first exposed me to torts, Seavey, Keeton, and Keeton (although I
eventually used the crucible of the classroom to test all but one of the
original "fab five").
The panorama began to change in 1971 with the appearance of
the Franklin and Rabin book,"° which rotated the torts world on a
California/New York axis, and over the next three decades a new gen11. CHARLES 0. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
(1959).
12. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1964).
13. PROSSER & SMITH, supra note 1, at x.
14. WARREN A. SEAVEY ET AL., NOTES FOR INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE WITH CASES ON
TORTS (1957).

15. For an instructive analysis of legal realism as embodied in the writings of Leon Green,
see Allen E. Smith, Some Realism About a Grand Legal Realist: Leon Green, 56 TEX. L. REV. 479

(1978).
16. This reflected the approach to torts taken by Fleming James, Jr. For an analysis of the

impact of James on the development of tort theory, see George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A CriticalHistory of the Intellectual Foundationsof Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 461, 470-81 (1985).
17. GREGORY & KALVEN, supra note 11, at vii.
18. See id. at Ch. 7. This chapter was notable for its thoroughness and the seriousness with
which it treated a subject often relegated to the periphery of the torts course.
19. See id. at Ch. 13. The materials on defamation provided wonderfully instructive coverage of the historical evolution of the tort. For insight into what motivated the comprehensiveness of this chapter, see Harry Kalven, Jr., Torts Casebooks on Parade: The Authors Meet the Users, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 4, 16 (1973) ("The reason there is so damn much about defamation in
our casebook is: I like it!").
20.

MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES (1971).
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eration of torts teachers brought forth new materials offering a panoply of fresh approaches and divergent viewpoints. It was as though
legal publishers had resolved to heed Chairman Mao's deathless dictum about "[l]etting a hundred flowers blossom. "21 Today, the newcomer to torts confronts a cornucopia of casebooks,22 and adventurous
souls have the opportunity not only to use modern photocopying
technology to assemble their own original materials, but also to mix
and match opinions and text culled from various existing casebooks.23
Those who feel the need to switch casebooks every few years in an effort to keep their pedagogy fresh (and I include myself in this group)
must struggle with the same embarrassment of riches.
It was in the course of my meanderings through the tortscasebook landscape that I came upon Professor Dominick Vetri's entry
in the field. 24 The quality that first attracted me was the way it fashioned a user-friendly introduction to the study of law, to the uniqueness of the common law, and to the centrality of process. The book
demonstrated an unusual sensitivity to the bewilderment of beginners
and made a special effort to anticipate their needs and concerns. Yet
what made Vetri's approach particularly intriguing was that it managed to play not only to nervous neophytes, but also to students in
need of intellectual challenge. It did so by raising issues that stretched
their minds by making them contemplate a larger canvas and think
even more analytically than they would in striving to master basic tort
doctrine and theory. The book's duality gives it a unique stamp and
will provide the focus of this review.
II. TORTS FOR TOTS
Tort law has traditionally served as a teething ring for firstsemester, first-year students, who must, in the first weeks of the
course, learn how to appreciate the importance of procedure, hone in
on the operative facts of a case, frame issues with precision, distinguish holding from dictum, and analyze the reasons underpinning a
judicial decision. Normally, the torts course pursues these goals in the
context of opinions dealing with intentional torts 25 because of their
21.

MAO TSE-TUNG, QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG 302 (1966) (the

"Little Red Book"). Law publishers, however, clung stubbornly to their habit of attaching useless indices at the end of their casebooks.
22. I count eighteen on my office shelves.
23. The West Group offers the customized publishing of materials selected from West and
Foundation Press casebooks. See Letter from Alice Mitchell, Custom Publishing Coordinator,
West Group, to Law Professors (Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with the author).
24.
25.

DOMINICK VETRI, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE (1998).
See, e.g., VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS

Ch. 2-3 (10th ed. 2000).
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relative simplicity. Vetri's resort to negligence cases as an introductory vehicle 26 gave me momentary pause, but the clarity with which he
presented the materials convinced me that at the outset of their exposure to the subject, students could grab hold of the concept of negligence and even begin to run with it.
Opening the course in this way acts as a partial antidote to the
current tendency at many institutions, including my own, to reduce
the number of hours devoted to the first-year torts course. Where
time is at a premium, it seems to me to make scant sense to spend several weeks on the minutiae of battery, assault, false imprisonment,
trespass, and related privileges and then have to race through, or omit
altogether, some of the more significant aspects of negligence and
strict liability.
Indeed, Vetri's inclusion of boxed summaries and flow charts at
strategic points in the text,
putting-it-all-together" and accomample supply of
plishment notes at the end of every chapter, 2 aan
2
9
practice problems does much more than help students through the
subtleties of the subject (and thereby reduces the risk that they might
fall by the wayside in the early weeks of the course). It also furnishes a
welcome counterweight to the pressures that seek to push students
into the panic-purchasing of commercial study aids.
Commercial study aids sit like uninvited guests at the banquet
table, and legal academics tend to ignore them, perhaps in the hope
that they will go quietly away. Yet study aids remain a fact of law
school life, so much so that each year they seem to multiply like weeds
after a summer rain. Moreover, study aids assume a variety of communicative forms-such as flashcards, charts, audio cassettes and interactive software-that go far beyond the paperback book or booklet
and feature not only course outlines, but also case briefs, sample questions and answers, and assorted memory aids.3 °
In a 1989 Washington Monthly article criticizing the shallowness
and misguidedness of study aids, Daniel Pink noted, "After spending
upwards of $20,000 a year to learn to think like lawyers, students
could be plunking down an extra 12 bucks to defeat the entire pur26. VETRI, supranote 24, at Ch. 1 ("An Overview of Negligence Law").
27. E.g., id. at 285 (duty flow chart), 605 (elements of assault).
28. E.g., id. at § 2.07 ("Putting Breach of Duty Analysis Together"), 353 (accomplishment
note on vicarious liability).
29. E.g., id. at 352.
30. I do not intend my criticism of "spoon-feeding" materials to apply to readings designed
either to expose readers to the varieties of thinking about tort law or to enrich their understanding of the subject in other ways. An excellent example of the former is ROBERT L. RABIN,
PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW (4th ed. 1995); the best exemplification of the latter is KENNETH
S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW (1997).
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pose.""1 Although his numbers need updating, the basic point remains valid. Experience suggests, however, that nervous 1Ls will remain vulnerable to the blandishments of publishers who play on their
insecurities, to the advice they receive from purportedly knowledgeable upper-class students, and to the highly competitive environment
of law school.
By including guideposts, bare-bones outlines, and summaries,
the Vetri book offsets the pressures pushing students to purchase
study aids. The presentation of basic concepts in a solid foundation
created by the casebook's editor not only serves to reduce jitters, but
also it assures both the relevance and the accuracy of these buildingblock materials. At the same time, this approach enables and encourages students to pursue issues more deeply. In feeling more comfortable with the basic concepts of tort law, students may be more easily
persuaded to undertake the conversion of the bare-bones outlines in
the casebook into points of departure for the exploration of more challenging pathways.
What can assist the instructor in efforts to broaden the scope of
the course beyond the confines of doctrine is the attention Vetri pays
to the torts process. While his is not the first casebook with this as a
major focus, the attention he pays to legal-process concerns that can
provide a theme for the course gives the casebook its intellectual rigor.
III. TORTS FOR GROWN-UPS

The process issues raised by Vetri have their roots in what has
come to be known as legal-process theory, a jurisprudential movement
emerging from teaching materials developed by Harvard Law School
Professors Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks,32 with important
contributions from their colleague Lon L. Fuller.33 An important feature of legal-process theory was its careful focus on the processes by
31. Daniel Pink, Law School Lite, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1989, at 20.
32. The Hart & Sacks materials remained unpublished for decades although they formed
the basis for courses offered at the Harvard Law School and other institutions. One professor
described feeling "a slight thrill as I held a copy of the famous book that never became a bookas if I had in my hands a samizdat or an artifact." Anthony J. Sebok, Reading The Legal Process,
94 MICH. L. REV. 1571 (1996). The material did not find its way between hard covers until
1994. HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994). On the history of legal-process theory, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P.
Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994).
33. For a discussion of Fuller's influence on Hart, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra
lxxxiii. For an intellectual biography of Fuller, see ROBERTS. SUMMERS, LON L.
note 32, at li,
FULLER (1984).
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which courts developed and applied common law, and the relative institutional competence of individuals, courts, legislatures, and agencies
to perform law-making and law-applying functions. "
In one respect, all torts casebooks have included opinions that
specifically touch upon one aspect of legal-process theory, the interplay between courts and legislatures, since it lies at the essence of the
doctrine of negligence per se.3" The methods utilized by courts to decide whether to adopt and apply as a measure of ordinary care the dictates of a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation not on its face
applicable to negligence actions constitute one example of how courts
make indirect use of legislative or administrative pronouncements, a
subject treated in the Hart and Sacks materials.36 Hence, torts teachers
have always dealt consciously or unconsciously with this legal-process
issue.
The first torts casebook to go beyond negligence per se in reflecting legal-process theory was Seavey, Keeton, and Keeton, which included a section exploring the relative roles of courts and legislatures
in serving the common law's competing demands for stability and
change.37 The cases selected here dealt directly with the judicial overruling of prior case law and incidentally with a particular type of indirect influence cast by statutes on the common law, 38 which are matters
developed at some length in the Hart and Sacks materials.3 9 It is
probably a safe guess that the editor responsible for introducing the
courts versus legislatures theme into the book was Robert E. Keeton,
who had previously addressed the problem of judicial overruling in an
34. Legal-process theory's seminal contribution derived from the original insights it offered
about the modern regulatory state and the sources and legitimacy of the legal ordering that governed it. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Legal Process Movement, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1578-80 (2d ed. 1999).
35. See, e.g,, PROSSER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 222-48; SHULMAN & JAMES, supra note
8, at 225-38.
36. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 468-73. Other points in a torts course where discussion of the indirect use of statutes might be inserted include the relevance of statutory rape
criminal statutes to the application of the defense of consent in battery actions, as well as the possible effect of statutes criminalizing failures to aid strangers in peril on claims that courts should
recognize a tort duty in these kinds of cases.
37. SEAVEY, KEETON & KEETON, supra note 3, at Ch. 9, § A.
38. See Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 176 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1961) (overruling prior decisions holding
driver liable to guest passenger only for willfully or wantonly inflicted injuries and imposing a
duty of reasonable care owed by driver to guest passenger); see also Spanel v. Mounds View Sch.
Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962) (overruling governmental tort immunity). In
Kaminetsky, the court cited a legislative repeal of a statutory exclusion removing guest passengers
from the protection of a law providing for claims against uninsured motorists as a factor supporting its decision to overrule precedent and impose a duty of ordinary care on motorists for the
protection of guest passengers.
39. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 576-84 (overruling common law precedent),
468-73 (indirect effect of statutes on development of common-law rules and doctrines).
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article4" and later revisited the theme in a monograph4 1 (both of which
revealed the influence of his Harvard confreres Hart, Sacks and
Fuller).42

Legal-process concerns, especially as articulated by Fuller, have
also animated the Henderson and Pearson torts casebook (aptly titled
The Torts Process), which first appeared in 1975.42 Thus, the treatment of whether or not to recognize a tort duty of due care to rescue
strangers in peril draws heavily on Fuller's distinction between the
morality of duty (setting the basic requirements of social living) and
the morality of aspiration (setting goals of excellence),4 4 which though
not specifically mentioned in the Hart and Sacks casebook, falls within
the parameters of the latter's preoccupation with determining how to
put proper restraints on judicial law-making.4" In a 1973 article arguing for the recognition of limits on the scope of tort liability for the
negligent or defective design of products, Henderson invoked Fuller's
concept of polycentricity or the interconnectedness that makes it impossible to resolve one issue without affecting a host of related others
to such an extent that resolution of the issue through adjudication is
undesirable.46 Polycentricity is mentioned en passant in Hart and
Sacks47 and, not surprisingly, is featured prominently in the Henderson and Pearson casebook.4"
40. See Robert E. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 462
(1962).
41. See ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW
Ch. 1-4 (1969).
42. In his 1962 article, Keeton cited HART & SACKS, Keeton, supra note 40, at 470 n.17,

481 n.43, as well as the work of Fuller, id. at 470 n.16. Keeton's continuing preoccupation with
legal process themes is illustrated by a later article on the availability of punitive damages in
wrongful death actions. See Robert E. Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and Values in Tort Law, 44 J. AIR
L. & COM. 2 (1978) (examining the phenomenon of interstitial law-making by courts when they
fill in statutory lacunae).
43. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS (1975).
Another noteworthy feature of the casebook was its innovative use of problems.
44. See id. at 499-500 (citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5-6 (rev. ed.
1969)). To illustrate the distinction, Fuller uses an analogy drawn by Adam Smith, who likened
the morality of duty to the rules of grammar and the morality of aspiration to the standards for
recognizing excellence in literary composition. See id. at 6.
45. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 640-47.
46. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973). Fuller's use of the notion of polycentricity as an argument for judicial self-restraint was not published in final form until 1978,
shortly after his death. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 353 (1978); see also Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Model's of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273,
1314-20 (1995) (discussing Fuller's conception of polycentricity).
47. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 647.
48. See HENDERSON & PEARSON, supra note 43, at 650. For other articles by Henderson
applying the jurisprudence of Fuller to tort law, see James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Neg-
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However, Vetri's is the first torts casebook to facilitate an extensive consideration of aspects of legal-process theory developed in Hart
and Sacks. It does so in large part within the precincts of an excellent
chapter on duty,4 9 an element of the negligence formula seldom given
its proper due in torts teaching materials."0
Courts are occasionally called on to decide whether or not to recognize obligations or defenses where none had existed before or where
prior holdings had refused to recognize them or to modify or eliminate
obligations or defenses created by prior judicial holdings. This raises
a fundamental legal process issue: what factors may a court properly
weigh in reaching such a decision? Moreover, under what circumstances might it be appropriate for a court to give dispositive weight to
its conclusion that the legislature would be the appropriate institution
to make the change sought by one of the parties to the litigation? Vetri
encourages discussion of these questions at various points in his duty
chapter.5 "
The chapter begins with Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co. ,2 which imposes a duty of due care on the assembler
of a new automobile for the benefit of consumers who might suffer
harm because of the assembler's failure to exercise adequate precautions. The case enables the teacher to illustrate how a distinguished
jurist utilized (some might say manipulated) precedent in a creative
way to make what in effect became new law, 3 an exercise that recalls
the way Hart and Sacks employed the opinion. 4 In addition, Vetri
poses the question whether the decision in MacPherson caught the
Buick Motor Company unfairly by surprise, 5 also an issue raised by
Hart & Sacks. 6
ligence Concept: Retreatfrom the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 468 (1976); see also James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Torts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1982).
49. See VETRI, supranote 24, at Ch. 3.
50. One notable exception is MARK F. GRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS Ch. 4
(1994).
51. See VETRI, supranote 24, at Ch. 3.
52. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). MacPherson normally makes its appearance in the products liability chapter of torts casebooks. E.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 722 (7th ed. 2000).
53. See id. at 179-80.
54. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 545. Spotlighting MacPhersonas an exemplification of common-law reasoning from precedent is neither recent nor unusual. See EDWARD H.
LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 7-19 (1949); see also EDGAR
BODENHEIMER, JOHN BILYEU OAKLEY & JEAN C. LOVE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 94-109 (2d ed. 1988).
55. VETRI, supra note 24, at 181.
56. HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 556-57. An interesting discussion point here is the
extent to which attorneys representing habitual defendants should anticipate changes in settled
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In a note following MacPherson, Vetri suggests that. in addition
to precedent, public-policy factors might also have supported the
holding of the case, and he sets out a list of factors, including deterrence, fairness, ease of administration, loss allocation, and consistency
with legislatively established policy as embodied in existing statutes.5 8
He touches lightly on these factors in his treatment of duty to rescue
and then goes back to them in more detail after his presentation of
Rowland v. Christian,9 the California decision imposing on possessors
of land a duty of ordinary care for the protection of entrants.
This material opens up the possibility of examining descriptively
how common-law judges go about making law and normatively if and
how they should perform this task. The use of policy factors has roots
in legal realism. Indeed, Leon Green was perhaps the first to invoke
them systematically in the context of tort law.6" Hart and Sacks takes a
more cautious tack here. The editors consider judicial law-making by
asking whether the opinion in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.61
correctly refused to recognize a common-law right to privacy and to
grant monetary and injunctive relief to the plaintiff for the use of her
likeness without consent to promote the sale of flour.62 The editors of
the casebook appear to be sympathetic to the creation of the new tort.
In giving their approval, the editors nod toward the arguments of
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in Warren and Brandeis's
famous article advocating recognition of a right to privacy and identifying from prior decisions a fundamental principle that protects the
inviolate personality of the individual.63 Also, the editors suggest both
that the right might have derived from "definite and provable patterns
of popular conduct"64 and a "general community understanding with
respect to the rightness or wrongfulness of appropriating a person's
photograph without leave for commercial gain"6 and that it might
have been implied from the "shared purposes of the members of the

common law doctrines or rules, and how they should channel such anticipation into practical
advice for their clients.
57. VETRI, supra note 24, at 180.

58. Id. at 196.
59. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), in VETRI, supra note 24, at 213.
60. See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM.L. REv. 1014
(1928).
61. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902), in HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 435.
62. Id.
63. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
64. HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 453
65. Id.

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 25:127

community" (a Fuller notion).66 Hart and Sacks' emphasis on careful
reasoning from basic principles and norms does not eliminate the risk
that judges might head down the fabled "slippery slope" and end up
deciding cases on the basis of their personal policy preferences.
Vetri points out this possibility in a succinct "Note on the
Sources of the Common Law" at the end of the chapter, where he ties
together the theme of judicial law-making with a synthesis of various
jurisprudential approaches to the question of the nature of law.6"
Without encumbering his discussion with labels, he describes the substance of formalism, legal realism, legal-process theory, and critical lerestraints affect
gal studies in an effort to provoke thought about what
69
judges as they exercise their law-making function.
At the close of his section on limited duty for negligently inflicted emotional harm, Vetri deals with the related problem of overruling precedent.70 Since the demands of the doctrine of stare decisis
require a further finding to the effect that the net gains to be derived
from disturbing settled law outweigh any negative effects that overruling might produce, it is not enough for a court to conclude that a prior
decision had been incorrectly decided or that, if the case had come up
as a matter of first impression, the court would decide it in a different
way. Vetri presents the various considerations that a court should
consider when making this balance,71 and these considerations are consistent with the treatment of overruling in Hart and Sacks.
Placing the overruling issue in the same chapter with material
dealing with how courts decide cases of first impression makes good
sense because of the obvious link between the two. Vetri permits the
instructor to revisit the issue and test student comprehension of it by
66. Id. It is curious that the editors did not mention natural law and the protections afforded to personal privacy by the United States Constitution, justifications given for the holding
in Pavesich v. New England Life InsuranceCo., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), which was the first American decision to recognize a right to privacy in tort. For a comprehensive treatment of the right to
privacy tort in teaching materials influenced by HART & SACKS, see PAUL J. MISHKIN &
CLARENCE MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
OF CASE AND STATUTE LAW Ch. 2 (1965).

67. Indeed, it is likely that Samuel D. Warren, whose article was instrumental in persuading courts to recognize a right to privacy in tort, was in fact motivated by his own peculiar attitudes about privacy. See James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.
L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875 (1979).
68. VETRI, supra note 24, at 278-82. For a different perspective criticizing legal process
theory for the restraints it would place on judges faced with law reform issues, see Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creativityand Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229 (1981).
69. For an excellent and comprehensive treatment of common law law-making, see
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).

70. VETRI, supra note 24, at 252-55.
71.

Id.

72.

See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 568-70.
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including Hoffman v. Jones,73 the path-breaking Florida decision overruling precedent and replacing contributory negligence with comparative fault, in a later chapter on defenses and immunities.74
The question of relative institutional competence is a fundamental concern of legal-process theory.75 However, there is a difficulty
raising it with first-semester, first-year students, who are in the throes
of a struggle to understand the judicial process and have had little or
no exposure to the legislative process. Hence, making meaningful
comparisons between the two institutions can be problematic.
The one obvious moment in the torts course when this might be
raised is in connection with the common-law rule providing that compliance with a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation is not
due care per se, but only some evidence from which a jury might infer
reasonable conduct.76 The complexities of the issue come to light even
more sharply in the product liability context with debate about
whether compliance with product safety regulations promulgated by a
federal agency should relieve manufacturers from liability.77 Unfortunately, there is too much here for first-year students to handle reasonably.
In one of the notes after Rowland, Vetri opens the floor to a discussion of whether courts should undertake the reform of common law
rules and doctrines or whether the task should be left to legislatures.7"
In opening this discussion, Vetri gives the instructor an opportunity at
least to flag this classic legal-process concern.79
IV. CONCLUSION
The Vetri casebook represents an interesting and thoroughly
worthwhile effort to permit instructors to reach both ends of the class
curve. The learning aids located at strategic points in the text provide
important substantive and psychological help for those finding it diffi73. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), in VETRI, supra note 24, at 531.
74. Id.
75. See HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 112, 158-67. On the importance of this concept
to the formulation of a modernized legal-process theory, see Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal
Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393
(1996).
76. The rule is tersely stated in VETRI, supra note 24, at 106 n.10.
77. For thorough coverage of the issue, see Symposium, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense
to Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000).
78. See VETRI, supra note 24, at 218 n.3.
79. Hart and Sacks raise the issue in the context of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis in InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). HART & SACKS, supra note 32, at 536. However, contrary to their usual practice, the
editors surprisingly offer no extended commentary on the factors Brandeis lists as supporting
judicial deference to legislatures.
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cult to catch on to the uniqueness of the study of law, while the editor's occasional forays into legal-process theory should invigorate
those in need of intellectual challenge. At the same time, the mass of
students between the two extremes can be made to feel more comfortable with the basics of tort law and less hesitant to take an occasional
plunge into deeper waters with their more adventurous classmates.

